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Abstract
Historical essay dealing with the regional processes of economic integration in 
Latin America, following the main phases of attraction and repulsion in those 
experiments; main challenges for the accomplishments of that integration have 
been industrialization efforts by countries, characterized by protectionist trade 
and industrial policies, defense of national sovereignty, and also rules presiding 
the multilateral trade system during the initial phase of Gatt; reforms in that 
system, allowing for some flexibility in the reciprocity clauses, started a new 
phase in that process, opening the way for a sub-regional approach in the 
integration agreements; Brazil and Argentina decided to create Mercosur, with 
a customs union framework to arrive at a common market objective; despite 
some progresses, the project is still unfinished.
Resumo
Ensaio histórico sobre os processos de integração regional na América Latina, 
segundo as diferentes fases de atração e bloqueio nos experimentos; principais 
desafios ao cumprimento dos objetivos integracionistas foram os processos de 
industrialização substitutiva nos países da região, marcados pelo protecionismo 
comercial e dirigismo industrial, a defesa da soberania nacional, além das regras 
do sistema multilateral de comércio na fase inicial do Gatt; reformas nesse 
sistema permitindo alguma flexibilização nas cláusulas de reciprocidade deram a 
partida a uma nova fase no processo, mas caracterizada pela sub-regionalização 
dos acordos de integração; o Brasil e a Argentina decidiram criar o Mercosul 
segundo um modelo de união aduaneira, mas tendo como objetivo um mercado 
comum; a despeito de algumas realizações, o projeto permanece inacabado.
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Historical context of previous attempts at integration
Regional integration in Latin America has a long history dating back the wars for independence 
in the 19th century. Notwithstanding, there is no need, for our purposes, to go back to the autonomist 
struggles of Simon Bolivar and other political and military leaders at the beginning of the 19th century, 
and to their premature attempts to forge an alliance between the many former Spanish colonies being 
liberated, because those efforts were most of a political nature and did not result in any institutional 
innovation at that time. The so-called “Amphictyonic Congress” of Panama (1826), and the various 
“inter-American” conferences held afterwards in some countries of the region, had very limited 
accomplishments, including because they were trying either to respond to external challenges – Holy 
Alliance attempts to “recolonize” their rebel offshoots, or the Monroe declaration, an unilateral 
American proclamation for the refusal of European interference in Hemispheric affairs – or settle 
differences among themselves, regarding State boundaries or international private law. By the end of 
that century, the United States even endeavored to unite the Latin American countries under a set of 
economic agreements that were perceived by them as favoring excessively the already gigantic economy 
of the northern neighbor, and refused to be bound by those economic arrangements. Nevertheless, 
a Bureau for Commercial Affairs was established in Washington in 1895, which served as a basis for 
the creation of a Pan-American Union in the 1920s, and was the trampoline for its transformation 
in the Organization of the American States (OAS), in 1948.
All those exercises were much more of a political than of an economic nature, which has to 
be the true pillar of any attempt at integration, starting by a gradual process of trade liberalization, 
going towards a progressive reciprocal economic opening and arriving at a common economic space 
that can even adopt a common currency and other legal dispositions touching social, political, 
defense and foreign policy issues, that are exemplified nowadays by the highly successful, none the 
less problematic, European experiment of political integration under the European Union. Without 
arriving at a similar result, Brazil and Argentina strive for something ambitious during the somber 
hours of the Second World War, having signed a customs union agreement in November 1941, open to 
neighboring countries, though which was rendered innocuous by the involvement of the Hemisphere 
in the war, after Pearl Harbor, and the differing postures assumed by Brazil and Argentina afterwards.
Contemporary Latin America integration efforts: fragmentation?
Latin America has of course a very different story than that of European region, both at economic 
experiments pointing to regional integration, and on the side of political efforts for the coordination 
of sectorial policies among the various countries of the region, which are represented, in our days, 
by Andean Community, Mercosur, Pacific Alliance, Unasur, Celac and some other institutions at a 
sub-regional level. A lot has been achieved since the post II World War to bridge the geographical 
distances and different cultures within the region and bring our countries closer together. Yet much 
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still remains to be done. Let us summarize this evolving process, which was conducted according 
to the multilateral rules of the international trade systems, started under the GATT (1948), and 
continued in the framework of WTO (1995).
As the integration process in Europe started its long journey towards political union in the 
Fifties, some countries in South America started to think about their integration: combining Keynesian 
prescriptions for macroeconomic policies with recommendations for guided industrialization à la 
List, South American countries formulated the first integration schemes with an eye to the European 
progresses arising from the Treaty of Rome of 1957. After the six original member countries of the 
European Common Market signed the Rome treaties (1957), establishing a more comprehensive process 
of economic union than the former (1947) Benelux customs union or the coal and steel community 
created by the Paris treaty (1951), some South American also started negotiations under the banner 
of ECLAC (the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) for a similar move towards 
some kind of economic union. In 1950’s, Brazil argued that greater continental solidarity and unity 
would be a consequence of overcoming poverty and destitution in the region: president Juscelino 
Kubitscheck proposal for a kind of Marshall Plan for Latin America in 1958 resulted in the creation 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, in 1960, and, in the next year, in the American sponsored 
Alliance for Progress, under president Kennedy.
The integration drive of Latin American countries, though, was limited to the very shallow 
experience of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC - Montevideo Treaty of 1960), 
which never delivered its promises for general trade liberalization among its South American 
members and Mexico. Frustrated by those limitations of this free trade model of integration, some 
Andean countries decided nine years later to establish a full-fledged European style of integration 
among themselves: the Andean Pact (1969), which promised not only a common market, but also a 
supranational mechanism for coordination (the Junta, in Lima), sectorial policies binding member 
countries under a whole set of common rules (for investments, for example) and a true Tribunal (in 
Bogota), emulating the Luxembourg court. Unnecessary to say that none of those reached completion, 
despite quite a lot of institutional building up and political coordination efforts. It is important to 
remark that the wave of military coups and authoritarian and nationalistic regimes of the Sixties 
and Seventies was not conducive to a solid degree of true liberalization and reciprocal opening, as 
each country pursued national programs of development, based in market reservations and “policy 
spaces” for their own industrial consolidation. For instance, Chile, after the 1973 Pinochet military 
coup, decide to leave the Andean Pact, and some years later started its own path towards integration 
into the world economic, opening its economy unilaterally and deciding to negotiate successive free 
trade agreements with like minded countries. 
At the beginning of the Eighties, a new wave of democratization touched Latin America, with 
the return to civilian and elected regimes, particularly in Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985), which 
signaled a new emphasis on economic integration. But the European model of a common market 
was too much ambitious for Latin American countries, which were in a de facto preferential trade 
area, with the signing, a few years earlier, of the second Montevideo Treaty (1980), performing a 
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flexible bilateral trade network among the members of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI). The change from ALALC to ALADI was permitted by a decision under the Tokyo Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations (1979), which enabled developing contracting parties of the GATT 
system to exchange more limited trade liberalization than previously disciplined by Article 24 of 
GATT, which settled the rules for exceptions to the most-favored-nation clause, under the free trade or 
custom union formats. The resurgence of regional cooperation within the democratization process of 
the 1980s paved the way for a new generation of economic agreements, the so-called open regionalism 
promoted by ECLAC, which during the 1990s expressed greater social and political awareness. 
Notwithstanding those regional initiatives, the different levels of political and economic 
development, and also differing characteristics of the industrialization process and related trade 
policies, from the mid-1980s onwards, were responsible for a new wave of sub-regional arrangements 
in South America, in the Caribbean and Central America, and especially in North America, with 
Mexico inclining towards the two big countries of the Northern Hemisphere, a process which resulted 
in the creation of the NAFTA, in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement. Towards the 
2000s, centrifugal forces were at play in the region, and the trend was pointing to new factors of 
fragmentation and dispersion: some blocs stayed united (as in the case of Mercosur), others remained 
fragile (such as the Andean Community), and individual countries or even entire sub-regions (Central 
America, Caribbean) looked for new opportunities together with dominant partners (United States, 
EU, China). Let’s look at this.
Mercosur enters the scenario: high expectations, some accomplishments
Following the Single Act (1986) in the European Economic Community, and free trade negotiations 
between United States and Canada, at the same time, Argentina and Brazil decided to start a common 
economic program, also in 1986, followed, two years later, by the signing of more ambitious agreement, 
establishing a full common market within a ten- year period. At the beginning, the process was not 
exactly modeled after the free trade scheme of the two previous schemes, but structured around 
sectorial agreements, according to the managed trade vision and the State interventionist practice 
of the two countries, in line with traditional developmentalist policies prescribed by the old masters 
of the ECLAC since late 1940s and the 1950s, among them Raul Prebisch (the first Central banker 
in Argentina, in the 1930s, after Director of ECLAC, 1948-1964, then chosen as the first Director 
of UNCTAD, in Geneva).
The two Southern Cone countries signed a complete Integration Treaty (1988), based on an 
approach made by the sectorial protocols for progressive integration that were agreed for two dozen 
different branches of their economies starting in 1986. Notwithstanding, they preferred a ‘Benelux-
like’ institutional format, made of intergovernmental schemes, instead of supranational structures 
such as those existing in the European model of integration. Shortly afterwards, under new, more 
liberal, governments in the two countries, Brazil and Argentina adopted a free-trade area model for 
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the speeding-up of the integration process: the time-frame approved in 1988 for the common market 
(ten years, up to 1998) was reduced to half by the Buenos Aires Act (July 1990), which also altered 
the gradual liberalization process for an automatic tariff elimination point to a free-trade area in 
four years, as the first stage towards a common market by 1995.
It is important to call attention for the new Brazil’s Constitution of 1988, which in its Article 
4 commanded Brazil “to seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples 
of Latin-America, viewing the formation of a Latin-American community of nations” as not only a 
matter of policy, but also, and foremost, as a new constitutional prescription. A very important move, 
adopted at that stage, and the one that defined the start of the European cooperation with Mercosur, 
was the decision to enlarge the process, with the acceptance of Paraguay and Uruguay into the, up 
to then, bilateral process. The negotiations started in 1990 upon demands from Chile and Uruguay, 
and developed for some months until they agreed to a new agreement, the Asuncion treaty (March 
26, 1991), rendering a quadrilateral what was, up to then, a bilateral decision to create a common 
market until 1995 (a very optimistic decision). 
It is also necessary to register that, despite being part of negotiations with the other Southern 
Cone countries, Chile, in fact, did not adhere to the new integration scheme, because of its single tariff 
(adopted many years before, and already registered in the GATT), which clashed with the diversified 
tariff structure wanted by Brazil and Argentina. Paraguay, instead, decided to join after a military coup 
that ended a four decades-long dictatorship. So, with the Asunción Treaty, the integration process 
started in Mercosur: under its customs scheme, national tariffs of the member countries had to be 
replaced by a Common External Tariff, with a lower average than the preceding national lists (which 
was accomplished by the end of 1994). That was a reversion and a relief on a historically structural 
defensive behavior in the trade policies of the member countries (except Paraguay, that always had 
a very low protective barriers). 
Despite a political approximation between European Union and Mercosur countries – a 
cooperation agreement signed from the start, pointing to a structured relationship in the process –, 
Asunción Treaty made no progress whatsoever towards a communitarian type of integration, modeled 
upon European institutions. The “Benelux scheme” – that is, an intergovernmental decision making 
process – was kept in place, even if a common market, to be inaugurated in January 1995, was always 
at the horizon. The Common External Tariff and a dispute settlement mechanism were agreed upon 
for the ‘transitional’ period (1991-94). Sectorial agreements (such as the automotive) kept being 
renewed each time, despite continuing promises of future free trade and complete liberalization 
(never accomplished, up to our days).
European Union cooperation, at that phase, limited itself to technical aspects of building a 
customs union. An inter-institutional cooperation agreement was signed, in 1992, between the European 
Commission and ‘Mercosur institutions’ with the objective of establishing the dialogue and technical 
cooperation between the two. At that stage, the Commission cooperated with the Administrative 
Secretariat of Mercosur in Montevideo, in the technical cooperation for the accomplishment of some 
studies focused on the tasks of the transition period. 
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Notwithstanding the formal agreements, and despite the strong support by the presidents 
themselves, the objectives established in the 1st article of the Asunción Treaty – common market, 
coordination of macroeconomic policies and so on – were not attained as expected. The four member 
countries truly advanced towards a free trade zone, but many exceptions were maintained, notably 
for sugar (restriction of Argentinian imports from Brazil) and automobiles (where a managed trade 
agreement was established between the two countries, leaving for an unforeseeable future for the 
free trade in the sector). Also, many national exceptions were substituted for the Common External 
Tariff, departing upwards or downwards from the official rate, and leaving ample margin for sectorial 
restrictions, intra and extra-bloc. 
Despite those shortcomings of the transition phase, the four countries proceeded towards 
the establishment of the customs union, but without any substantive changes in the institutional 
architecture of Mercosur: the negotiation and signing of the Ouro Preto Protocol, in December 1994, 
confirmed Mercosur in the ‘Benelux model’. The same tools and mechanisms that were at work during 
the transition period were confirmed for the new stage of Mercosur, with the addition of a Trade 
Commission to the two main decision bodies of the bloc, Common Market Group (executives) and 
the Council of Ministers (the decision upper body). Chile and Bolivia (despite Bolivia’s membership 
of the Andean Community of Nations), not joining as full members, were accepted as Mercosur 
associates in 1996, taking part in the meetings, without voting powers.
From that moment onwards, Mercosur acquired its new status as an entity under international 
law, which allowed an upgrade in its relationship with European Union. After preparatory ministerial 
meetings all along 1995, the two integration schemes signed in Madrid, December 1995, a joint 
declaration solemnly establishing a framework agreement of inter-regional economic cooperation 
with the objective to pursue a political association and render possible trade liberalization among 
them. Negotiations started in 1999, at the same time that parallel discussion were taking place with 
all other Hemispheric countries – under the American project of a Free Trade of the Americas – and 
never reached, both processes, to any conclusion whatsoever. At that moment, the tide in international 
economy was turning again.
New turbulent times, both for countries and trade blocs
The general trend of this phase can be described as such. Despite a favorable political situation 
among Mercosur member countries – except for political crises in Paraguay, provoking the establishment 
of a “democratic clause” as a new instrument in the bloc – the international environment, though, 
was not cooperative. The external shocks starting with Mexico’s insolvency, in December 1994, going 
through Asian financial crises, between 1997 and 1998, and culminating with Russia’s moratorium 
and a huge investment company (LTCM) crash in Wall Street, between July and August of this year, 
all those shocks impacted Mercosur countries very seriously, especially Brazil, which had accumulated 
huge imbalances in its current accounts. The next, and most dramatic stage was the deepening of 
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the crisis in Argentina, between 1999 and 2002, with direct impact in Mercosur’s ability to sustain 
its pace.
The detailed scenario developed as follows. Since the inception of the customs union, in 1995, 
few substantive advances were accomplished in commercial integration, and perhaps more restrictions 
– both inwardly and outwards – were introduced than promises of trade liberalization were realized. 
The free trade zone among member countries works more or less on the same bases that were put 
in place during the 1991-1994 period and the customs union started in 1995 probably now covers 
fever products than was the case at the beginning: there is no agreement among specialists, on how 
much of the imported items within Mercosur is traded under the official rates fixed in the Common 
External Tariffs, as the exceptions lists allowed to each member (at a variable number among them) 
keep changing by regular intervals.
After some years of liberalization policies and tariff reduction measures in trade, and already 
presented in GATT as a new “customs union” (at least in paper), Mercosur was confronted with a 
entire range of challenges, linked to the international financial crises of the second half of the 1990s, 
starting by Mexico (in 1994), followed by Brazil (in 1999), touching Argentina (in 2000 and 2001), 
and again Brazil (in 2001-2002), that were at the origin of some reversion in intra-regional trade 
flows, foreign investments, exchange volatility and fiscal imbalances. Total trade among its members 
declined to half of the high volumes attained just before the Brazilian currency crisis, in 1999, to be 
reversed only by the end of the first decade of the new millennium.
At the beginning of the 2000s, member countries refrained from adopting open protectionist 
policies only because there was a belief in, and a commitment to, the conclusion of the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations; there was also a certain sense of relief derived from various experiments 
in devaluation of national currencies, which assured, during some parte of the following decade, 
gains in the form of trade balance surpluses (not to mention the peaks in commodity prices, both 
agricultural and mineral, which was represented by the “Chinese bonanza years”). As soon as the 
WTO negotiations foundered, at the end of the 2000’s, and the external competitiveness of Mercosur’s 
products were slashed by a raise in domestic costs, the defensive posture of the political authorities 
and the protectionist instinct of the industrialists emerged again, as vibrant as in the old times of 
import substitution.
Mercosur expands, somewhat erratically, in the region, but stays stalled
Peru became an associate member in 2004, and sometime after the other Andean countries 
signed bilateral commercial treaties with Mercosur countries, within the framework of ALADI (LAIA), 
All these schemes are limited in the tariff reductions and privileges accorded, and all have too many 
bilateral exceptions to effectively create new flows of trade among those countries. Other associations 
or full memberships were being negotiated with other countries in the regions, with this peculiar 
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feature that few of them require the adherence to the Common External Tariff, legally registered in 
the GATT, and supposedly the basis of its Customs Union.
The Venezuela admission into Mercosur is a case in itself, because it did not followed the normal 
procedures established by the Asunción Treaty. Under the leadership of controversial Hugo Chávez, 
Venezuela requested its admission, a decision adopted in 2006; at the same moment, though, Chávez 
openly said that Venezuela was entering Mercosur to profoundly change its nature, from a free-trade 
capitalist bloc to an integration system identified with his ‘Socialism of the 21st century’. The process 
was a very troublesome, with the Paraguay Parliament refusing to accept the entrance of Venezuela 
in Mercosur, arguing for the non respect of non identified technical norms in the trade policies of 
the Andean and Caribbean country, or commercial barriers still pending against its exports; other 
arguments relied on the non democratic nature of the Bolivarian State of Venezuela.
Finally, taking opportunity of the quick impeachment of the Paraguayan president in 2012, 
the two big member of Mercosur agreed politically – and against the procedures of the Ushuaia 
agreement on the “democratic clause” within Mercosur – on the “suspension” of Paraguay from the 
bloc, adopting immediately a resolution in favor of the acceptance of Venezuela in it, even if this last 
country did not accept all the norms and requirements to become a full member. This generated a 
crisis that was at the origin of a downward trend in the political credibility crisis within Mercosur, 
only partially surmounted with the election of a new president in Paraguay, two years later. 
During the whole period, EU maintained negotiations in order to conclude trade liberalization 
and association agreements. The bi-regional Free Trade Agreement between Mercosur and EU, devised 
to serve as a compensatory relationship in face of the hemispheric negotiations, was derailed as 
soon as the proposed FTAA, already opposed by Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela was dismissed at a 
hemispheric summit in Mar del Plata, Argentina, November 2005. The reluctance emerging from all 
trade partners in the two negotiating processes was probably due for the same reasons: divergences 
among the partners in connection with European and American farm protectionism, and resistance 
from Mercosur countries in industrial, services and intellectual property matters. Absent the bargain 
element in this complex relationship, the bi-regional project EU-Mercosur has been stalled since 
then, and has little chances of being concluded successfully, despite a political rhetoric in favor of it.
The true test within Mercosur – and not only for its democratic clause – is currently represented 
by Venezuela’s status of full member status (albeit being suspended by the four original members). The 
decision taken in 2012 was completely political in nature, as Venezuela, under the peculiar economic 
policy of the Bolivarian regime, departs fundamentally from the capitalist rules that, in differing 
ways, govern the integration process in the Southern Cone. Of special relevance on the economic 
aspects of this problematic Venezuelan membership is the capacity of the current administration in 
Caracas not only to comply with the many internal requirements of an integration process, but also 
to follow and accept formal negotiations with prospective partners in liberalization trade agreements 
or in multilateral talks at large. 
On the political side of this venture, many representatives of the legislature in Mercosur countries 
question whether Venezuela complies, in deeds, with the democratic clause of the bloc, either formally 
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or substantively. As it stands currently, the democratic clause of Mercosur has no power to exert, 
in its written form, any kind of pressure against the gradual erosion of the normal functioning of 
a democratic regime. Irrespective of the domestic evolution of politics in Venezuela, as well as the 
economic interests linked to its full membership in Mercosur, the participation of the Bolivarian 
regime in the bloc represents a direct challenge to its economic rationality and the democratic 
adherence that supposedly guide its construction.
Unasur is another case in point, because it also has a democratic clause, but has taken no 
initiative – conversely, it has been kept irresponsibly silent – in respect to the evident erosion of the 
democratic life in Venezuela in the last few years. For other matters, such as physical integration or 
the coordination of the many regulatory matters in order to facilitate real economic integration among 
its member countries, Unasur has not been as effective as one would expect from an “integration” 
organization. But this reality is inevitably connected to phases of “trial and error”, or “learning”, of 
any new institutions created by social and political initiatives. United Nations or Bretton Woods 
organizations also experienced similar evolution, towards socially responsible progress.
What lies ahead for the integration process in Latin America and in Mercosur?
Universalism and regionalism are part of Brazilian foreign policy traditions. Brazil has been a 
leader in promoting multilateralism and its main pillar: the concept of the legal equality of states. 
Within the Western hemisphere, it has also contributed to make the concept of development the 
common denominator for integration.
Since the early 2000s, there have been new efforts in Latin America’s integration, towards 
enhanced political coordination and the proposal of new regional initiatives. Several institutions 
have been created, such as the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (Celac), and the Pacific Alliance. The coexistence of these diverse 
recent associations with previous projects such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) has 
been widely discussed from different perspectives.
Currently, from the Brazilian perspective, the challenge is to further advance regional integration, 
reinforcing and expanding Mercosur, while seeking common ground with other sub-regional schemes 
including the countries of the Pacific Alliance. The main objective is to strengthen common values, 
such as democracy, sustainable development, physical integration and social inclusion aiming at 
generating wealth and promoting the general well being of the Latin America society.  
But what are the challenges ahead? Mercosur is a factor for the economic and technological 
modernization of its member countries, as well as for their insertion into the world economy. To these 
dimensions, one has to add another one, that is, the ultimately constitution of a common market in 
the Southern Cone, which is to form the basis for a free trade area in South America. Needless to say, 
all these should be based on the fundamental assumption of the continuity of democratic regimes 
everywhere (a condition which, in some countries at least, is far from assured).
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Irrespective of the time frame for these developments, all this is dependent on two or three 
conditions. First of all, Mercosur countries must consolidate their integration process irreversibly, by 
accomplishing the objectives set forth in the first article of the Asuncion Treaty, that is, the constitution 
of a common market. After more than 25 years, Mercosur remains what it was at the beginning: 
a project for a future single market. Truly, this main goal, which is the very essence of Mercosur, 
depends also on the coordination of macroeconomic policies among the member countries and the 
harmonization of national policies in strategic sectors (this also is in the same 1st article of Asunción 
treaty). To advance towards these objectives, Mercosur has to strengthen its institutionalization. 
That is not so simple, as we are touching the very heart of the ‘sovereignty instincts’ of each one of 
the member countries. The retrenchment into national sovereignty still has a powerful attraction.
Secondly, to allow a smooth implementation of these objectives, Mercosur members have to 
continue and deepen the structural reforms that are indispensable to carry out the same objectives: tax 
reform, fiscal and exchange reforms (including currency convertibility), sectorial reforms (industrial 
and trade policies), labor and administrative reforms, and others. They are needed because otherwise 
there will be no macroeconomic convergence and exchange coordination: the constitution of a single 
market would be impossible without them. Some countries are undergoing some of these reforms, 
but they are taken on purely domestic bases, with no coordination with other member countries. And 
of course some countries, perhaps like Brazil (in tax reform) are reforming in a direction that is not 
convergent, if not contradictory, to Mercosur’s number one objective, namely the common market.
Thirdly, but not the least, these structural reforms have to be accomplished with another objective 
in mind: economic opening to the world, and continuity of trade and investments liberalization. Since 
the inception of the Common External Tariff – which required a prior domestic reform of national 
tariffs – in 1995, the overall evolution of trade policies in Mercosur and in each of the member 
countries has taken the road of closure, restriction, tariff escalation and many other restrictive devices, 
that is, making Mercosur more, not less, protectionist. The average rate of effective protection since 
1995 has moved upwards and is slightly incremental as a whole, but is openly protectionist in some 
sectors (classified as sensitive, but in fact ransomed by lobbies and special interests). Mercosur has 
to engage, decisively, a new tariff reduction across the board.
Difficulties erected on the road to a common market – and the continuity of the reform 
process – in Mercosur could be classified into two groups: structural impediments and contingent 
factors. Among the later, are the natural limitations of the national processes of macroeconomic 
stabilization, which are not completely implemented, even after years – or decades, some would 
say – of hyperinflation, external crises associated with excessive foreign debt, volatility of capital 
flows, and currency debilitation, as well as low growth or even stagnation, with ensuing political 
and social crises. 
On the structural side, asymmetries between countries are deemed relevant, not only in terms 
of the proper dimension of each country – with Brazil, for instance, representing some 70% of the 
‘atomic mass’ of Mercosur, in GDP figures, external and internal trade, capital and investments 
flows, etc. – but also as a result of the level and intensity of the industrialization and technological 
Regional integration in Latin America: historical developments, current challenges, especially in Mercosur 11
Meridiano 47, 19: e19015, 2018 Almeida   
advancement (with big disparities going, again, in favor of Brazil). From those structural features 
derive differentials in competitiveness and in attractiveness for investment, which raise reactions in 
each of the other associates and in fact hinder the consolidation and progress of Mercosur towards 
higher levels of integration, both internally and with the world. There are many other asymmetries, 
for instance in educational and social indicators, with Argentina and Uruguay performing much 
better than Brazil and Paraguay but the most important ones are, of course, the aggregate sum of 
economic capabilities; and that gives an extraordinary ‘power’ to Brazil. 
Also relevant enough, this time for institutional motives is that this enormous differential among 
member countries does not reflect in the decision-making process. As is very well known, this process 
is characterized by the perfect equality of duties and obligations among all member countries, and 
this comprises the vote (and veto) power, giving the same weight to each of them. So, Uruguay, with 
its 3.5 million inhabitants, has the same capacity in the decision-making of Mercosur – and thus, 
formally, in the determination of its main policies – than has Brazil, with its 207 million population. 
There are many processes or structural features that seem to be determinant in the future course 
of Mercosur, in its proper, ‘domestic’ dimension, or in connection with external factors. They can 
be summarized as follows:
1.   Domestic changes in institutional politics and economy, in member countries, without 
discontinuity in their pluralistic and democratic regimes;
2.   The willingness of their political leaderships to continue to push towards integration, in 
spite of the social costs, that in some sectors would be inevitable;
3.   The establishment of a realistic work agenda, coordinated for the best among member 
countries, pointing to the joint overcome, in the short term, of contingent obstacles, and, 
in the medium term, of the limitations and structural hindrances for the full integration of 
the markets; that is of course the most difficult question;
4.   The preservation of economic growth and external competitiveness, in order to maintain 
the attractiveness to foreign capital and reciprocal investments in Mercosur countries;
5.   The continuity of macroeconomic reforms and in specific sectors (like taxation, industrial 
and trade policies), with the adoption of an ‘integrationist outlook’ in the various aspects of 
this process, including standards and technical regulation, the coordination of legal systems 
and the integration of regulatory policies;
6.   The preservation of the economic stability, and of political and social peace in the region, as 
this reflects on the external relationships of Mercosur, in especial regarding the consolidation 
of the agreements already concluded with Andean countries (CAN), as well as the continuity 
of other schemes for the physical and political integration in the continental context (currently 
within the framework of the Unasur, the South American Union of Nations); 
7.   Progresses the multilateral trade negotiations (either an end to Doha Round, or a new round 
within WTO), that area heavily dependent on success in the farm and industrial sectors, 
besides services and intellectual property;
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8.   The extension and deepening of trade liberalization agreements with other blocs, such as 
the Pacific Alliance and other partners, in the region or elsewhere, especially in Asia, as they 
represent a real big challenge for Mercosur, either as means to attract of new investments 
or in terms of market access to those huge markets;
9.   What are the current and future relationships between Mercosur and other key partners 
in the world economy, such as United States, the European Union and, forcibly for South 
America, China, as the new main trade partner of many countries in the region? There 
will be a common response to those linkages – not only of a commercial nature – or each 
country, or bloc, will look for its specific interface, according to its own characteristics and 
capabilities? 
With this last feature in the format of two question marks, we have to conclude this brief 
examination of the regional integration process in Latin America with an optimistic note. Despite 
many shortcomings and frustrations, the region has not lagged behind the world: with some efforts, 
it has kept pace with the many transformations and changes occurring in the great interdependent 
and contradictory process that is called globalization, accompanying the trends with some differences 
among the countries, but with a sense of pertaining to the same universe of cultural performances 
that link our people to the greatest accomplishments of civilization: democracy, human rights, full 
liberties at individual level. Those are the values and principles that are, and must be, at the core of 
the Latin American countries.
